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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Vs. 
LARRY ELLIOT and WILLIAM 
H. CLAYTON, 
No. 17350, 17351, 17358 
Defendants-Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants were charged by information, filed on 5 June, 
1980, for violating provisions of Section 76-5-405 (1) (a) (ii), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, to wit: engaging in a sexual act involving 
the genitals of one person and the mouth of another, without the 
consent of the victim, DENNIS FRAZIER, compelling submission to 
the said sexual act by the threat of death or serious bodily 
injury to be inflicted imminently on the said DENNIS FRAZIER. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellants were found not guilty of violating Section 
76-5-405 (1) (a) (ii), but were found guilty of violating Section 
-1-
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76-5-403 (2), forcible sodomy, a lesser included offense. Bot! 
Appellants were subsequently committed to the Utah State Pri~ 
serve terms of not less than one year nor more than fifteen ~ 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants respectfully seek reversal of the lower Court' 
judgment or, alternatively, an order remanding the case for a 
trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants were charged with having violated Section 
76-6-405(1) (a) (ii), Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The Trial Cour· 
instructed the jury relative to that Section as well as to one 
lesser included crime, to wit: Section 76-5-403(2), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, Forcible Sodomy. Counsel for Appellant, CL~ 
had submitted a written request for an instruction on Section 
76-5-102.5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Assault by a Prisoner. 
record does not indicate CLAYTON'S counsel objected to the Coo 
refusal to so instruct. Appellant, ELLIOT'S, counsel made an 
request, in chambers, for instructions on Section 76-5-102, Ut 
Code Annotated, 1953, Assault, and Section 76-5-103, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, Aggravated Assault. Elliott's counsel did~ 
to the Court's refusal to instruct on those two Sections (See: 
Minute Entry, "Trial", Page 60 of the Record on Appeal and 
-2-
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Transcript of Trial, Page 237, Line 1.) 
The facts relative to the criminal activity involving 
Appellants and occuring on the night of 4 May, 1980, at the Utah 
County Jail vary according to which witness one chooses to 
believe. Those facts are addressed later herein. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: THIS COURT MAY PROPERLY REVIEW THE TRIAL COURT'S 
REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON SECTIONS 76-5-102.5, 
76-5-102, AND 76-5-103, AS THESE REQUESTS WERE 
SUBMITTED TO THE TRIAL COURT IN A TIMELY MANNER. 
This Court has previously ruled that it may exercise its 
discretion to review an orally requested instruction. See State v. 
Bell, 563 P2d 186, (1977). Appellant Elliott's oral request for 
instructions on Sections 76-5-102 and 76-5-103 were apparently 
taken in chambers immediately prior to reading the approved 
instructions to the jury. Elliott's counsel further objected to 
the Court's refusal to so instruct, in the record. Elliott's 
request and objections appear to both be timely. It appears from 
the Minute Entry, "Trial", Page 60 of the Record on Appeal, that 
discussion also was had on Elliott's request. Appellants' 
assignment of error to the Trial Court's refusal to instruct on 
the crimes of Assault and Aggravated Assault is in a proper 
posture to be reviewed by this Court, at its discretion, pursuant 
-3-
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to Rule 19(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 51, 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Appellant Clayton's written request for an instruction m 
Section 76-5-102.5 was apparently also discussed and argued,~ 
chambers, prior to reading the instructions to the jury, alt~ 
the nature and extent of those arguments are nowhere noted in 
record. Clayton's counsel did not make a record of his object 
to the Court's refusal to instruct on that section. However, 
this request was written and in the file of the matter, and 
subsequently argued for in Chambers, it was certainly brought 
sufficiently to the attention of the Trial Court in time for~ 
be included in the approved instructions had the Trial Court f: 
it appropriate. Appellants urge, notwithstanding Clayton's 
failure to make a record of his objection to the refusal to 
instruct on Section 76-5-102.5, that this Court exercise its 
discretion and review the refusal to instruct on this Section 
also. 
POINT II: THIS COURT MAY REVIEW THE TRIAL COURT'S 
REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT ON SECTIONS 76-5-102.5, 
76-5-102, AND 76-5-103, AS WELL AS THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT ON OTHER 
NECESSARILY INCLUDED LESSER OFFENSES, AS 
MANIFEST INJUSTICE WOULD RESULT OTHERWISE 
As argued in Appellants' initial Brief to this Court, ~U 
19(c), allows this Court to review error assigned to instruct~ 
-4-
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in order to avoid manifest injustice, notwithstanding a party's 
failure to object or request specific instructions. Accordingly, 
if it is necessary to avoid manifest injustice, this Court may 
review the Trial Court's refusal to instruct on the three offenses 
listed in Point I, above, even if Appellants' requests and 
objections are found to be inadequate or non-existent. Likewise, 
this Court may also review the need for giving instructions on 
other lesser included offenses argued for in Point III of 
Appellants' initial Brief and addressed again in Point III, 
herein. 
In its responsive Brief, the State argues that Appellants 
have not made a showing of the needed manifest injustice. 
However, in attempting to establish such manifest injustice 
Appellants are in a "damned if they do - damned if they don't" 
predicament. They cannot secure this Court's review if they do 
not make a showing of manifest injustice; but they cannot make a 
showing of manifest injustice if this Court does not consider the 
other points in their Appeal. 
Appellants contend that manifest injustice resulted when they 
were denied the right to take their theory of the case to the 
jury because the Trial Court wrongfully limited the scope of the 
jury's consideration by wrongfully limiting the number of lesser 
included crimes in its instructions. This Court must consider 
whether there were additional lesser included offenses within the 
greater charge of Aggravated Sexual Assault and whether there was 
-5-
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evidence that could have caused reasonable men to acquit 
Appellants on the greater charge and convict them on one or ~ 
of the omitted lesser charges before it can rule on the issue 
manifest injustice. 
Further, the crime charged was a felony of the first d~r 
The conviction was for a felony of the second degree. The 
offenses for which Appellants feel they were entitled to 
instructions range from a felony of the second degree, to fek 
of the third degree, down to a class B misdemeanor. The term 
imprisonment for a felony of the first degree is 5 years to li: 
Section 76-3-203(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953; the term of 
imprisonment for a felony of the second degree is 1 to 15 year 
Section 76-3-203(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953; the term of 
imprisonment for a felony of the third degree is not more than 
years, Section 76-3-203(3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953; the ter 
imprisonment for a class B misdemeanor is not more than 6 mont 
Section 76-3-204(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953. If the Trial 
Court should have instructed the Jury on other lesser includea 
offenses, then it was manifestly unjust for the Trial Court M 
do so in light of the immense variance between the term of 
imprisonment for the offense the Appellants were convicted of 
the terms of imprisonment for the offenses that the jury shoui 
have rightfully considered. See again those cases cited in~ 
II of Appellants initial brief, i.e.: August vs. U.S., 257 F. 
(1918); State v. Cobo, 60 P2d 592, (1936); State v. Close, 49~ 
-6-
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287, (1972); State vs. Marks, 602 P2d 1344, (1979); State vs. 
Baker, 617 P2d 39, (1980). 
If this Court finds that other lesser included offenses 
should have been considered by Appellants' jury then this Court 
should also find that manifest injustice resulted - Appellants 
were denied their vital right to take their theory of the case to 
the jury in a setting of a grave and serious charged offense and 
convictions of long terms of imprisonment. 
POINT III: FORCIBLE SODOMY IS NOT THE ONLY POSSIBLE 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE WITHIN AGGRAVATED 
SEXUAL ASSAULT. 
Appellants agree that State vs. Brennan, states the rule in 
determining lesser included offenses: 
•.. The greater offense includes a lesser one when establish-
ment of the greater would necessarily include proof of all 
the elements necessary to prove the lesser. State vs. 
Brennan, 371 P2d 27, (1962). 
The elements of Aggravated Sexual Assault, as charged in the 






Engaging in a sexual act; 
Involving the genitals of one person and 
the mouth of another; 
Without the consent of the victim; 
Compelling submission to said sexual 
act by the threat of death or serious 
bodily injury; 
To be inflicted imminently; 
on said victim. (See: Nature of The Case, 
herein) 
-7-
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Respondent has conceded that Forcible Sodomy, Section 
76-5-403(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is a necessarily les~ 
included offense within Aggravated Sexual Assault, (See Page 6 
Brief of Respondent). Likewise Respondent has conceded that 
Attempted Forcible Sodomy, is a lesser included offense within 
Aggravated Sexual Assault, (see Page 15 of Brief of Respondent 
Assault, Section 76-5-102, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, a c: 
B misdemeanor, is also a lesser included offense within Aggrav: 
Sexual Assault. Assault can be defined as a threat to do bodi: 
injury to another, accompanied by a show of immediate force or 
violence. To establish Aggravated Sexual Assault, one must pre 
a threat of death or serious bodily injury to another. Proofc 
that element necessarily includes proof of a threat to do bodil 
injury to another - an element of Assault. Similarly 
establishment of the element that the actor threatens imminent 
injury or death is part of the proof of Aggravated Sexual Assau 
Proof of that element necessarily includes proof of a show of 
immediate force or violence - an element of assault. Admitted\. 
the wording is different but the meaning is the same. In ord~ 
for an actor to threaten imminent injury he must accompany his 
threat with a show of immediate force or violence. One might t 
threateningly, but his words alone cannot portend imminent inju: 
without a concomitant showing of his ability to muster immediat: 
force or violence. Aggravated Sexual Assault is just what the 
name implies - an assault, primarily, with sexual motivations a 
-8-
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goals, aggravated by threats or infliction of serious injury or 
death. As such, simply assault is necessarily included within the 
greater prohibited act. 
Aggravated Assault, Section 76-5-103, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, a felony in the third degree, is also a lesser offense 
within Aggravated Sexual Assault. An aggravated assault is an 
assault accompanied by the use of a deadly weapon or such means or 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. Again, 
proof of a threat to do bodily injury is necessarily accomplished 
by establishing a threat of death or serious bodily injury; and 
proof of a .show of immediate force or violence is necessarily 
accomplished by establishing a threat to inflict that injury 
imminently on one's victim. Further, proof of the use of a deadly 
weapon or such means or force likely to produce death or serious 
bodily injury is necessarily accomplished in establishing a threat 
to inflict death or serious bodily injury imminently on one's 
victim. One must prove that a deadly weapon or force was used in 
order to establish a threat of imminent death or serious bodily 
injury. Words, alone, make for hollow threats; use of a deadly 
weapon or force is necessary to establish the imminent quality of 
the threat. One cannot threaten imminent death or serious bodily 
injury without exhibiting the immediate capability to inflict 
death or serious bodily injury; and one cannot exhibit the 
immediate capability to inflict death or serious bodily injury 
without using a deadly weapon or means or force likely to produce 
-9-
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death or serious bodily injury. 
Respondent asserts that Aggravated Assault by a Prisoner, 
Section 76-5-103.5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, cannot be ales 
included offense within Aggravated Sexual Assault as both of~ 
are made felonies of the second degree by statute. Appellants 
disagree. Aggravated Sexual Assault carries the penalty of a 
felony of the first degree; see Section 76-5-405 (2), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. 
Respondent does make a creditable point when it asserts f 
both Assault by a Prisoner, Section 76-5-102.5, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, and Aggravated Assault by a Prisoner, Section 
76-5-103.5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, are not lesser included 
offenses within the charged offense by reason of the additioni 
element of the actor's status as a prisoner. Appellants, howeve 
assert that the status of the actor is germain only to sentenc: 
and that both of these offenses are lesser included offenses 
within Aggravated Sexual Assault for the same reasons as Assaul 
and Aggravated Assault. 
Appellants concede here that Respondent has prevailed in: 
argument that Forcible Sexual Abuse, Section 76-5-404, is note 
lesser included offense in this case. 
It is urged that the offenses of Attempted Forcible Sodo~ 
Assault, Aggravated Asssault, Assault by a Prisoner, and 
Aggravated Assault by a Prisoner are necessarily lesser inclu~ 
offenses within Aggravated Sexual Assault. 
-10-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT IV: EVIDENCE ADMITTED AT APPELLANTS' TRIAL ESTABLISHED 
A RATIONAL BASIS FOR A FINDING THAT APPELLANTS 
WERE NOT GUILTY OF THE CHARGED GREATER OFFENSE 
OF AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT BUT WERE GUILTY OF 
ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSES: ATTEMPTED FORCIBLE SODOMY, ASSAULT, 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, ASSAULT BY A PRISONER, 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT BY A PRISONER. 
Appellants agree with Respondent that the rule for 
instructing the jury on lesser included offenses is codified in 
Section 76-1-402(4), Utah Code Annotated, 1953: 
"The Court shall not be obligated to charge the jury 
with respect to included offenses unless there is a rational 
basis for a verdict acquitting the Defendant of the offense 
charged and convicting him of the included offense." 
Respondent correctly points out that the above statute is 
worded in the conjunctive sense. There must be both a rational 
basis to acquit on the greater charge and a rational basis to 
convict on the lesser. But Respondent incorrectly asserts that in 
this case none of the lesser offenses should have been charged as 
the evidence could not support a conviction on any of them. 
This Court's test for a rational basis to instruct on lesser 
included offense has been stated and affirmed many times: 
"The well established general rule, that the jury should 
be instructed on lesser included offenses when such a con-
vict ion would be warranted by any reasonable view of the 
evidence, is in accord with and supported by our Statutory 
Law." (Emphasis added.) State vs. Close, supra. 
-11-
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See also: State v. Johnson, 185 p2d 738, ( 194 7) ; State vs. 
Castillo, 457 P2d 618, ( 1969); State vs. Gillian, 463 P2d Bll, 
( 1970); State vs. Bell, Supra; State vs. Torres, 619 P2d 694, 
( 1980); State vs. Dou9herty, 550 P2d 175, ( 1976) . Other 
jurisdictions have ruled similarly: Stevenson vs. United Sta~ 
16 S.CT. 839, (1896); Bowers vs. People, 617 P2d 560, (1980); 
People vs. Glenn, 615 P2d 700, (1980); State vs. Jimerson, 618 
1027, (1980). 
This Court has also stated the same rule in the negative· 
instructions on lesser offenses must be given unless there is: 
evidence tending to reduce the greater offense. See: State vs. 
Fer9uson, 279 P.55, (1929) and State vs. Chestnut, 621 P2d 122' 
( 1980). 
This Court has also formulated a settled method for apply: 
the above-cited rule: 
"The usual rule on an appeal in which the challenge is 
to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict 
is that we review the record in the light favorable to ~ 
jury's verdict. However, in this situation where the 
question raised relates to the refusal to submit includ~ 
offenses, it is our duty to survey the whole evidence a~ 
the inferences naturally to be deduced therefrom to see 
whether there is any reasonable basis therein which wouN 
support a conviction of the lesser offense." Gillian, su: 
Respondent has likened this case to the situation which 
occured in Dou9herty, supra. There Defendant-Appellant claimei 
complete innocence. He claimed to have been an unwitting part,· 
the sale of marijuana. This Court rightfully refused to find 
-12-
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error in the refusal to give an instruction on the lesser included 
offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance. Dougherty had 
not shown any evidence to support a conviction on the lesser 
offense. All of his evidence pointed to either guilt of the 
greater offense or complete innocence. 
But in reviewing the entire transcript in this case, in the 
attitude required by Gillian, supra, this Court will find that, 
unlike the Defendant in Dougherty, neither Appellant held himself 
out as blameless. Rather this Court will find substantial 
evidence was admitted from which reasonable men could have formed 
both a rational basis to acquit Appellants on the greater charge 
and a rational basis to convict Appellants on one or more of the 
lesser offenses. 
Defendant, Elliott's witness, Carl William Howe, testified he 
had not seen either Appellant perform or attempt to perform 
sodomy on the victim on the date in question, although he did ob-
serve activity which the jury might have considered an assault 
had they been so instructed; page 144, line 17, through page 147, 
line 11; page 150, line 1 through page 151, line 30. 
Appellant Clayton told the Jury he slapped and punched the 
victim but denied threatening him with death or serious bodily 
injury and further denied attempting sodomy on the victim: page 
157, line 26 through page 160, line 23; page 161, line 21 through 
page 161, line 28; page 163, line 20 through page 164, line 29; 
page 165, line 12 through page 170, line 13; page 172, line 15 
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through page 173, line 7. 
Appellant Elliott also repeatedly admitted assaulting t~ 
victim yet denied making threats of death or serious bodily L-
or making attempts at sodomy on the victim: page 175, line 24 
through page 183, line 12; page 184, line 7 through page 187, 
12. 
One reasonable view of the above testimony is that Appel! 
did not commit nor attempt to commit sodomy on their victim. 
Another reasonable view is that they did not threaten to infli· 
their victim with imminent death or serious bodily injury, erg 
Aggravated Sexual Assault was committed. 
On the other hand, it is reasonable to view that same 
evidence as warranting a finding that Appellants did commit an 
assault upon their victim - that they attempted, with unlawful 
force or violence, to do bodily injury or that they threaten~ 
do bodily injury while exhibiting immediate force or violence. 
Reasonable men could have found that the above evidence 
indicated a force likely to produce serious bodily injury was 
used but that Appellants did not attempt sodomy. Such action 
would be Aggravated Assault. 
Reasonable jurists could have also concluded that the 
Appellants, without threatening death or serious bodily injury, 
attempted to force sodomy on their victim but did not 
succeed. That would constitute Attempted Forcible Sodomy. 
Certainly, there are reasonable views of the foregoing 
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evidence that would warrant a conviction on one or more of the 
lesser included offenses. There is also a reasonable view of the 
evidence that would warrant acquittal on the greater charged 
offense (the jury did subscribe to that view). But, by submitting 
only three possible verdicts to the jury, the Trial Court 
precluded any findings that reflected rational beliefs that 
Appellants were guilty of Attempted Forcible Sodomy or Assault or 
Aggravated Assault. 
Respondent has stated the jury "must" have been convinced 
Appellants committed sodomy because they returned a verdict marked 
guilty on Forcible Sodomy. That is not necessarily so. The jury 
may have been convinced "a" crime was committed but they may have 
reached their verdict not by choosing the lesser included offense 
they believed in but by choosing the lesser of two evils. The 
Trial Court's instructions, in effect, limited the jury to a 
consideration of only a part of the evidence. As this Court has 
held: 
"It is always a delicate matter for a trial court to 
withhold from the jury the right to find accused guilty 
of a lesser or included offense and determine the question 
of the state of the evidence as a matter of law. That should 
be done only in clear cases." State vs. Hyams, 230 P. 349, 
( 1924). 
CONCLUSIONS 
In light of the charged offense and the factual setting in 
this case, there were more lesser included offenses than Forcible 
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Sodomy. A reasonable viewing of the evidence admitted at the 
trial of this matter would warrant an acquittal of the charg~ 
offense and at the same time convictions on one or more of the 
lesser included offenses. This Court should review the Trial 
Court's failure to instruct on the various lesser included 
offenses less manifest injustice result. This Court should ~ 
reverse the Judgment of the lower Court or remand this case fu 
new trial in order that Appellants may have a jury consider au 
the necessarily lesser included offenses that are appropriate, 
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